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give flexibility to the trust and discretion to the donee; 26 a donee would seldom wish
his appointment to be irrevocable, even though he might foresee no need for revoca-
tion. These considerations apply to the instant case and should have created a pre-
sumption in favor of revocability.
Interstate Commerce-Restraint of Trade-Dividends from Oil Pipe Line Sub-
sidiaries Rebates under Elkins Act-[Federal].--On September 30, 1940, the Anti-
Trust Division of the Department of Justice brought suits in the name of the United
States under the Elkins Act" against certain shipper-owner oil companies and subsidi-
ary pipe line companies.2 The shipper-owner oil companies were receiving dividends or
profits from their subsidiary common carrier pipe line companies or from the operation
of common carrier pipe line departments, which, the complaints alleged, were pro-
hibited by the Interstate Commerce Act3 and the Elkins Act as rebates from the rates
filed by the common carrier with the ICC.4 The United States asked that the defend-
ant pipe lines and shippers be enjoined from granting and receiving the alleged rebates
and that the defendant shippers be required, as provided by Section 1(3) of the Elkins
Act,s to pay the United States three times the total amount of rebates found to have
been illegally paid since January 1, 1939. A consent decree was entered into on De-
cember 23, I94I, in a new action filed for this purpose by the United States against
twenty major oil companies and fifty-nine pipe line companies. The decree provided
that no defendant shipper-owner shall receive in any year from its pipeline subsidiaries
or departments more than a 7 per cent return on its ownership share of the ICC valua-
tion of the pipe line properties, 6 and that earnings over this amount must be retained
by the subsidiary or department in a special surplus fund to be used only for its opera-
tions as a common carrier. United States v. Atlantic Refining Co.7
The control by a few corporations of interstate pipe lines, by far the cheapest form
26 Leach, Powers of Appointment, 24 A.B.A.J.'807 (1938); Powell, Powers of Appointment,
io Brooklyn L. Rev. 232 (1941).
'32 Stat. 847-48 (i903), amended by 34 Stat. 587-89 (19o7), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-43 (1929).
2United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and Phillips Pipe Line Co., Civil Action No.
82, U.S.D.C. Del. (i94o); United States v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., CivilAction No. 183,
U.S.D.C. Del. (194o); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Civil Action No. 201,
U.S.D.C. N.D. Ind. (i94o).
3 24 Stat. 379, 381 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 6(7) (1929).
4 The complaint in the Standard Oil suit alleged that the dividends paid by the Stanolind
Pipe Line Company (crude oil) to the Standard Oil Company (Indiana) between 2931 and
1939 amounted to 48 per cent of Stanolind's transportation revenues for the same period; the
corresponding figures for the Great Lakes Pipe Line Company (gasoline) and the Phillips Pipe
Line Company (gasoline) were alleged to be 49.5 per cent and 38.1 per cent, respectively. The
complaints were based on data taken from the annual reports of the pipe lines to the ICC.
s 34 Stat. 588 (19o7), 49 U.S.C.A. § 41(3) (1929).
6 A pipe line corporation which fails to earn 7 per cent in any year may, however, pay in
dividends the difference between its earnings and the permitted 7 per cent for that year within
the next three years, in addition to the 7 per cent payments allowed for those years.
7 Civil Action No. i4o6o, D.C. D.C. (1941) (unreported).
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of overland oil and gasoline transportation,8 has long been an important source of
monopoly in the petroleum industry.9 By the Hepburn Act of 19o60 and subsequent
judicial interpretation,! all interstate pipe lines which were not strictly plant facilities
were made common carriers subject to the'Interstate Commerce Act and such supple-
mentary legislation as the Elkins Act. Prior to the Hepburn Act many pipe lines re-
fused to carry oil unless it was sold to the pipe line owners.12 Although this device is
not available to common carriers,3 a similar monopolistic result is reached by setting
minimum tenders (the minimum amount accepted in a single shipment) too large for a
refinery without large storage capacity,14 and, more important, by charging relatively
high transportation rates.Is The shipper-owner pays or credits to its pipe line subsidi-
ary or department the same rates for transportation of its oil as does the independent
shipper. But the payment back to the shipper-owner of the dividends or profits de-
rived from the shipment of its own oil in effect reduces the shipper-owner's cost of
transportation to the cost to the common carrier, however high the published rates;
8Transportation of crude oil by rail costs approximately 8.3 mills per ton-mile, by pipe line
approximately 3.2 mills per ton-mile. Shipment by tanker, however, is still cheaper, being ap-
proximately 1.25 mills per ton-mile. Cook, Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil
Companies, TNEC Monograph No. 39, at xg (1941). Gasoline transportation costs are about
the same. Ibid., at 37.
9 See The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
'034 Stat. 584 (1907), 49 U.S.C.A. § I(1)(b) (1929).
ixThe Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (i94); Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S.
141 (i939). These cases hold that a pipe line transporting only its own oil for its own use is
subject to the act if the oil is purchased from other sources and does not come from its own
wells. See 2 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 96-io5 (i93i).
22 The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 559 (x914). The transportation rates of those pipe
lines which accepted shipments of other refineries before i9o6 were generally the same as the
railroad tank car rates. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. IIS, 124
(1940).
13 Certain pipe lines, however, still claim that they are not common carriers. Valvoline Oil
Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141 (I939). The complaint in United States v. American Pe-
troleum Institute, Civil Action No. 8524, D.C. D.C., filed Sept. 30, i94o, asked that the major
oil companies be enjoined from operating common carrier pipe lines as private carriers.
14 Many pipe lines have set minimum tenders as high as ioo,ooo barrels. Reduced Pipe Line
Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. I I, 134 (1940). In Brundred Bros. v. Prairie Pipe
Line Co., 68 I.C.C. 458 (1922), the ICC found that requirement of a tender in excess of Io,ooo
barrels was unreasonable; this figure is taken as a general basis in Reduced Pipe Line Rates
and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. ii5, 136 (i94o). In addition to minimum tenders, some
gasoline pipe lines have exceedingly restrictive specifications as to the gasoline which may be
shipped; the Sun Oil Company practically restricts shipments to gasoline equivalent to "New
Blue Sunoco," thus excluding lower grade gasoline, which is the sole product of many inde-
pendent refineries. Cook, op. cit. supra note 8, at 39.
25 Since the Hepburn Act crude oil pipe line rates have been reduced to some extent, per-
haps more because of competition from tankers than because of ICC action. Reduced Pipe
Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. IIS, 124 (1940). Corporate income taxes,
especially since 1933, have also forced pipe line subsidiary corporations to lower their rates
somewhat. Ibid., at 127, 139; Hamilton and Associates, Prices and Price Policies 152 (1938).
Gasoline pipe line rates, however, are still only slightly lower than rail rates. Prewitt, The
Operation and Regulation of Crude Oil and Gasoline Pipe Lines, 56 Q. J. of Econ. 177,
'
190
(1942).
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this represents a competitive advantage to the shipper-owner over the independent
shipper. The shipper-owner gains a further competitive advantage from its receipt of
dividends or profits derived from the shipment of independent oil.16
The United States contended in its original suits that the payment of these divi-
dends to the shipper-owner amounts to a rebate under the Elkins Act, since it was, in
effect, a deduction from the published rates. This contention is supported by the prin-
ciple of equality among shippers under the Interstate Commerce Act,"7 as illustrated by
the case of New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. ICC.s Moreover, many dicta
indicate that the Elkins Act, which was enacted in 19o3 to make more effective the
anti-rebate provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act,9 was intended to reach all de-
vices by which property may be transported for less than the published rate,2 0 and
that results, not intentions, determine whether the commerce acts have been violated.2r
'
6 The complaint in the Phillips case alleged that, if dividends are set off against payments
for transportation of gasoline from Borger, Tex., to Kansas City, Kan., a shipper-owner has
an advantage of 1.4 cents a gallon over an independent shipper paying the same published
rates. This is approximately 25 per cent of the value of the gasoline at the refinery.
Although pipe lines are legally common carriers they are operated by the major oil com-
panies to a very large extent as plant facilities; relatively little oil of independent shippers is
carried. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. I5, 121, 138 (1940).
Consequently, while major oil companies have been able to establish refineries close to the
market for gasoline in metropolitan and other populous areas, small independent refineries, un-
able to build their own trunk pipe line systems, have been forced to remain close to their
sources of supply in the oil fields, with the attendant hazard of exhaustion of the field and the
expense of shipping gasoline to market by gasoline pipe lines owned by the majors or by even
more expensive forms of transportation. Hamilton and Associates, op. cit. supra note 15, at
147, 151.
17 3-B Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 359 et seq. (1936).
18200 U.S. 361, 391 (19o6). In this case the New Haven and the Chesapeake & Ohio rail-
roads were enjoined under the Elkins Act from performing a contract whereby the C. & 0.
sold West Virginia coal for delivery to the New Haven in Connecticut for less than the sum of
the cost of the coal to the C. & 0. and the published rate for transportation to Connecticut.
The Court refused to attribute the deficit to the C. & 0. as a dealer, looking to the real result
of the transaction. For an able analysis of this case from the point of view of the United States
in the instant case, see Black, Oil Pipe Line Divorcement by Litigation and Legislation, 25
Cornell L. Q. 510, 5x4-19 (x94o). It should be noted, however, that the Court in the New
Haven case did not assert that the mere receipt of profits on the transportation of its own coal
at the published rate was illegal; what was held unlawful was an actual sale at a price lower
than would cover transportation charges. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. ICC,
200 U.S. 361, 398 (i9o6). But this is the type of unfair competition which is made possible for a
shipper-owner by the receipt of profits on its own shipments. In addition see note 47 infra.
19 Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 289,
324 (1937). The object of the act was to maintain the revenue of railroads against general re-
bating. Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulations 492-93 (i916). But it has been continuous-
ly used to further the purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act in attacking discriminations.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361 (I906); notes 2o and 21 infra.
20 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 72 (i9O8); New York, New Haven &
Hartford R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (I9O6); United States v. Union Stockyard & Transit
Co., 226 U.S. 286, 309 (1912); United States v. Koenig Coal Co., 270 U.S. 512, 519 (1926);
see Black, op. cit. supra note i8, at 519-23.
21 Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 462 (1941).
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The Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins Act, however, do not seek to equalize
all advantages one shipper may have over another;" even if a rebate is defined as any
payment back to the shipper, it must be an "illegal rebate" to come within the prohibi-
tions of the acts.23 Section 15(13) of the Interstate Commerce Act4 implies that an
allowance shall be paid for services or facilities furnished by the shipper in connection
with transportation by the common carrier, provided only that the allowance is
reasonable.'5 The normal arrangement under this section has been the payment to the
shipper of a fixed allowance for individual facilities and services.2 It might be argued
in the instant case, however, that the reasonable allowance to the shipper-owner of the
common carrier is profits, the return usual to ownership and development, since the
profits are derived from rates under the supervision of the ICC. The strategic im-
portance of these profits as monopolistic devices, however, should lead to a particularly
close scrutiny of rates with regard to the return they yield to ownership. The ICC in
setting rates usually takes into account factors other than the return to owiiership;'7
this is likely to lead to returns excessive in the light of the problem of discrimination be-
tween shipper-owners and independents. The large profits made by many pipe line
companies'8 further indicate that the ICC has not in the past exercised a dose super-
vision with regard to this problem.29 Thus it seems desirable that limits should be set
2 See ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42,46(i91 ). For example, a railroad is not required to
equalize transportation costs for competitors whQ are at different distances from the market;
quite the contrary is true. See Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 445 (i915). But in the Assigned Car
Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583-84 (T927), the Court said that the ICC in limiting the use by coal
companies of their own private cars in times of car shortage was not attempting to equalize
fortunes; see Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent, ibid., at 584; cf. The Pipe Line Cases, 234
U.S. 548 (1914).
23 See United States v. Koenig Coal Co., 270 U.S. S12, 518 (1926).
'4 34 Stat. 590 (1907) as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(13) (Supp. 1941).
sICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42 (ii); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 231
U.S. 274 (1913). The section itself does not in terms require that an allowance be paid; it
merely limits the allowance to what is just and reasonable.
26 Such allowances have been made to shippers for elevation services, ICC v. Diffenbaugh,
222 U.S. 42 (Igii); for supplying terminal facilities and lighterage, United States v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. Co., 231 U.S. 274 (1913); for trackage and lateral hauling, Mitchell Coal & Coke Co.
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230U.S. 247 (913); for supplying tank cars, General American Tank
Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 3o8 U.S. 422 (1940).
27 Such factors include uniformity of rates among competing carriers, volume of traffic,
competition of other forms of transportation, interests of localities served, effect of rates on
other carriers under the commission's supervision, and interests of stockholders of the common
carrier who are not shipper-owners. But see Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges,
243 I.C.C. IIS, 144, 145 (194o), discussed page 508 infra.
28 The 1935 earnings of thirty-five crude oil pipe line companies investigated by the ICC
ranged from a deficit of o.6o per cent to earnings of 46.86 per cent upon the ICC valuations of
their properties. Nine pipe lines earned over 20 per cent and twenty-one earned over 8 per
cent. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. IIS, 142 (1940).
29 Prior to the ICC investigation, Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243
I.C.C. ii5 (i94o), only two cases involving pipe lines had come before the commission in
addition to The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914). These were Crude Petroleum Oil from
Kansas and Oklahoma to Lacy Station, Pa., 59 I.C.C. 483 (1920), and Brundred Bros. v.,
Prairie Pipe Line Co., 68 I.C.C. 458 (1922). Not until 1934 was a valuation of pipe line proper-
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directly on the payment of profits by a common carrier to a shipper-owner.3° The con-
sent decree in the instant case, by limiting the receipts of the shipper-owner to 7 per
cent, solves the problem in these terms.
When courts have been confronted with this problem of setting a reasonable return
under Section x5(13), as distinguished from the problem of determining whether the
shipper is entitled to any return,31 they have taken the view that a rate-making func-
tion of the ICC is involved.32 The desirability of uniform decisions in such questions,
and the much greater experience and facilities of the ICC in dealing with such prob-
lems, led to the development of the doctrine of the primary jurisdiction of the ICC.33
In the absence of a finding by the commission, the courts have held that they have no
jurisdiction,34 or have suspended action until the conclusion of an appropriate adminis-
ties undertaken. See 2 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 96-ios (193i);
Prewitt, op. cit. supra note IS, at 203-6.
30 Compare the recapture clause of the Transportation Act of 192o, applicable only to rail-
roads. 41 Stat. 489 (1921), 49 U.S.C.A. § i5a(S), (6) (1929). This clause was repealed in 1933,
48 Stat. 220 (1934), 49 U.S.C.A. § i5b (Supp. 1941), because of its unworkability in the com-
plex railroad situation. See 3 -B Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 221-55
(1936).
3' Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Intemat'l Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
32 General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422 (1940);
Mitchell Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 247 (1913).
33 Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (19o7) (no common law
action for unreasonable rates where rates not found unreasonable by ICC); Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481 (191o) (discrimination in car
distribution); United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (re-
striction of through rates and joint rates to particular carrier); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
American Tie & Timber Co., Ltd., 234 U.S. 138 (1914) (whether crossties were included in
tariff); cases cited note 32 supra (allowances for services by shippers); cf. Great Northern R.
Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922) (construction of carrier tariff, where no
question of fact or discretion is involved, requires no preliminary resort to commission); see
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 139 (1939); 2 Sharfman, The Interstate
Commerce Commission 393-4o6 (931). A distinction can be made between private suits and
suits by the United States, but the possibility of divergence among courts on questions of fact
and discretion would seem to make the principle equally applicable. United States v. Pacific &
Arctic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (913). On the question of the constancy of the
policy of the prosecuting agency, see Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 207-29 (937)
(anti-trust laws).
The principle of the primary jurisdiction of the ICC has been extended to suits for triple
damages under the Sherman Act where there are no circumstances creating a wrong irremedi-
able under the commerce acts. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U.S. Soo
(1936), noted in 46 Yale L. J. i56 (1936); cf. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 26o
U.S. i56 (1922), noted in 36 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (1923) (private shipper cannot recover under
Sherman Act where railroad rates are subject of complaint); U.S. Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Cunard Steamship Co., Ltd., 284 U.S. 474 (1932) (Shipping Act supersedes Clayton Act).
Whether the principle extends to suits by the United States under the Sherman Act is dubious.
United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (913) (prosecution al-
lowed).
34 St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico R. Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District, 304 U.S.
295 (938); United States v. Pacific & Arctic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
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trative proceeding.s The long-continued acquiescence of the commission in the pay-
ment of dividends or profits to shipper-owners by common carrier pipe lines making
large profits3 6 would make a court very reluctant to disturb the situation without
affirmative action by the commission.37
It is interesting to note that the ICC has recently entered an order to show cause
why rates of each crude oil pipe line company should not be reduced to a point where it
would earn not more than 8 per cent of the value of its pipe line properties.38 Though
this proposal of the commission differs in approach from the suits and the consent
decree in the instant case, since it operates on receipts of the common carrier rather
than on payments by the common carrier to the shipper, it is aimed at the same ob-
jective.39 Disregarding uniformity of rates among pipe lines between the same points,
the commission's proposal makes the return to ownership of each pipe line the exclu-
sive basis of rates.40
Union of financial interest between a shipper and a common carrier, or the merging
of the two functions, has been recognized as highly productive of discriminations against
other shippers, often leading to monopoly.4' In the case of the railroads this led to the
inclusion of the commodities clause42 in the Hepburn Act of 19o6, forbidding railroads
to transport commodities owned by them. As the clause was first drafted, it applied to
3S Cases cited note 32 supra.
36 The ICC has not attempted to set a reasonable return under § x5(i3), as it may of its
own motion, nor has it readjusted pipe line rates, even though the basic facts on which the
complaints in the instant case were based were before the ICC in the annual reports of the
pipe lines. Note 4 supra. Although the ICC undertook an investigation of crude oil pipe lines
in 1934, no final order has been entered. Reduced Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 1I5
(1940).
37 The acquiescence of the ICC might even be held to be evidence that the shipper-owners
did not knowingly take rebates. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 556
(igig). It is difficult to reconcile this case with Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209
U.S. 56 (igo8), and other cases cited notes 2o and 21 supra; the Lehigh Coal case has never
since been cited. But the acquiescence of the ICC and the novelty of the theory of the Anti-
Trust Division might incline the Court to construe the statute against the United States. Cf.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 6oo, 613-14 (1941) (alluding to novelty of construction
of Sherman Act).
38 Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 115 (i94o); see note 28
supra. Minimum tenders were also to be lowered to a maximum of io,ooo barrels. The con-
sent decree does not deal with minimum tenders, which are a significant restriction on inde-
pendent shipments.
39 Conversely, the consent decree makes it desirable for pipe lines to reduce rates on the basis
of earnings in order to avoid the accumulation of an idle fund.
40 This is the point of difference between the majority opinion and Commissioner Mahaffie's
dissent. Note 27 supra. See Prewitt, op. cit. supra note i, at 206-IS.
41 New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. ICC, 200 U.S. 361 (19o6); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); Red Rock Fuel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., il Inters.
Com. Rep. 438, 449 (59o5); Att'y Gen'l v. Great Northern R. Co., i Drew. &Sm. 154, 29
L.J. (cH.) 794 (i86o); i Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission 42 (193).
42 34 Stat. 585 (19o7), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(8) (1929).
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all common carriers;43 but as it was finally passed it was limited in scope to the rail-
roads, thereby excluding pipe lines from its operation. If the clause were extended to
pipe lines, as has frequently been proposed,44 and effectively implemented and inter-
preted,4s a severance of pipe lines and oil companies would be achieved for all practical
purposes.46 The adoption of the theory of the Anti-Trust Division in the original suits
in the instant case, which would lead to the imposition of severe penalties on shipper-
owners taking any profits from operation of their pipe lines, would achieve much the
same result by rendering it profitless for a shipper of oil to own pipe lines.47 On the
other hand, the result of severance might be directly reached by a prosecution under
the Sherman Act,4 such as that now pending against the major oil companies in United
States v. American Petroleum Institute.49 The consent decree in the instant case was
43 Beard, Regulation of Pipe Lines as Common Carriers 114 (1941); Ripley, op. cit. supra
note ig, at 514.
44 Beard, op. cit. supra note 43, at ir4-16; Black, op. cit. supra note i8, at 533.
4s The commodities clause as interpreted is peculiarly full of loopholes suited to the oil
industry. In United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (igog), it was held that
commodities produced by the carrier must be owned by the carrier at the time of transporta-
tion to come within the clause, and that commodities owned by a "bona fide" separate, though
affiliated, corporation may be carried. If in the course of dealing "the distinction is obliter-
ated" between carrier and shipper corporations, the clause applies. United States v. Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 238 U.S. 516 (i915). But 1oo per cent stock ownership by the
parent corporation is not in itself a sufficient showing of dominance to identify carrier and
shipper. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R. Co., 298 U.S. 492 (1936); see Kibler, The
Commodities' Clause 98-i5o (r9i6); Black, op. cit. supra note 18 at 532-36. It would be im-
possible to show that the Great Lakes Pipe Line Company, co-operatively owned by eight
major oil companies, was "identified" with any one of its owner corporations.
46 Arguments against the wisdom of this result are advanced in Beard, op. cit. supra note
43, at 120-26. National defense needs may also make it unwise to risk a period of transition
in a vital industry. Note 49 infra.
47 The enactment of the commodities clause, however, indicates that Congress, at least,
thought that the Elkins Act alone could not bring about this result, even though the New
Haven case, discussed in note i8 supra, had previously been decided. If the Elkins Act could
accomplish severance, such suits as United States v. Delaware & Hudson R. Co., 213 U.S. 366
(i909), note 45 supra, failed because the United States relied on the commodities clause rather
than the Elkins Act. This consideration applies equally to pipe lines, and Congress was per-
suaded in enacting the Hepburn Act of i9o6 that it was not desirable in their case to force
severance by means of the commodities clause. Yet it was this very act which brought pipe
lines under ICC regulation.
48 In United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920), the union of a railroad and a coal
company under a dominant holding company was held illegal under both the commodities
clause and the Sherman Act. Cf. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920);
see Black, op. cit. supra note 18, at 523-32.
49 Civil Action No. 8524, D.C. D.C., filed Sept. 30, 194o. The Anti-Trust Division planned
to ask for severance in that action. N.Y. Times, p. 27, col. 5 (July 30, 194o). Filing of the suit
was delayed, however, pending investigation of its effects by the National Defense Advisory
Commission. N.Y. Times, p. 15, col. 2 (Aug. i, i94o). The complaint actually filed asked, as
far as pipe lines were concerned, merely that they fulfil their obligations as common carriers.
Note 13 supra.
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entered into expressly without prejudice to any rights in the American Petroleum In-
stitute case.50
Labor Law-Specific Performance of Collective Bargaining Contract with Union
'Whose Majority Status Is Uncertain-[California].-Two AFL locals, the plaintiff
paperworkers' union and a local of the pressmen's union, were engaged in a dispute as
to which should be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of
the defendant paper box manufacturer. The two locals agreed to a privately conducted
election, which the plaintiff union won by a small majority. The plaintiff union and
the defendant then entered into a closed-shop contract. Several months later the
plaintiff union demanded that the defendant discharge those employees who were
not members of the plaintiff union, while the pressmen's union threatened to strike
if it did. Another election was held and the plaintiff union, winning again by the
same majority, once more demanded that the defendant discharge members of the
pressmen's union. The pressmen's union insisted that the second election had been
fraudulent, claiming for itself the actual majority and repeating its threat to strike.
The defendant thereupon refused to negotiate further with either union until the juris-
dictional dispute had been settled between the two locals. The plaintiff union sought a
decree for specific performance of the contract. The defendant contended not only
that the contract was based upon the misapprehension that the contracting union had
a majority, but also that specific performance might subject him to charges of unfair
labor practice by the NLRB. Held, the principal consideration moving from a labor
union to an employer in a collective bargaining agreement is the promise of "indus-
trial peace." Upon the plaintiff union's failure to keep its promise of "industrial
peace," the consideration failed. The parent body of both unions, the AFL, not
the courts, should decide which is the appropriate bargaining agent. Petition dismissed.
Barnes v. Angelus Paper Box Co.,
Many courts now grant specific performance of collective labor agreementsy2 and
So It is not to be expected that a lowering of pipe line rates as a result of the consent decree
will have any immediate effect on the price of gasoline; the payment of rates and the receipt of
profits being mere intercompany bookkeeping, the same profits will be shown on another phase
of the operations of the integrated corporate system. In the past, profits on pipe lines have
covered losses in other departments, especially marketing. Prewitt, op. cit. supra note is, at
199-201. The effects of the consent decree are to be found not in any change in the costs of
the major oil companies, but in a readjustment of the competitive situation.
19 Lab. Rel. Rep. 386 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1941).
2See the cases and articles collected in Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts,
48 Yale L.J. 195 (1938). A reading of these cases gives a remarkable cross section of the social
awareness of American courts. Thus we have, on the one hand, the eloquent and realistic
dictum, "An agreement upon wages and working conditions between the managers of an.indus-
try and its employees, whether made in an atmosphere of peace or under the stress of a strike
or lockout resembles in many ways a treaty. As a safeguard of social peace it ought to be con-
strued not narrowly and technically but broadly and so as to accomplish its evident aims and
ought on both sides to be kept faithfully and without subterfuge." Yazoo & Mississippi
Valley R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C.C.A. 5th i933). On the other hand, we find such
statements as, "The breach of a contract to employ only members of a certain union will not
be enjoined. 32 Corpus Juris 199." Bakery and Confectionery Workers' Internat'l Union v.
Clifton Bakery Corp., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. If 6o,o66 (N.J. Ch. 1940).
